treatment is being offered or given. A patient seeking treatment will normally wish to consult a medical practitioner who has well recognised and conventional qualifi cations appropriate to the particular services being sought. People may from time to time seek advice and help from practitioners who do not hold generally recog nised conventional qualifications; but most would wish to do so with an under standing of die nature of die qualificadons and cxperdse claimed by any such practidoner. The value to die public of informadon concerning die qualifications and experdse of practidoners is generally recognised, as is dial oi its cerdficadon by a reputable independent agency.
Even when cerdfied informadon about qualilicadons and experdse is provided, die asymmetry problems are not fully resolved. The further issue for die padent is whedier to trust and accept die advice being given by die doctor, pardcularly in die context of a possible pecuniary interest of diat doctor in die advice being given. This is, of course, an issue in any commercial transacdon, but diere is a widespread view that padents are more vulnerable in medical consultations dian customers gen erally are in dieir purchases of goods and services. This view is more valid when a padent has symptoms or disabilities not previously experienced, and has litde un derstanding of die malady concerned. There arc also small but appreciable risks of an adverse outcome from treatment, and of exploitation by an unscrupulous practi tioner.
However, die traditional method of addressing die quality issues diat asymmetry raises, namely, licensing of medical practice, increases die risks of diminished acces sibility to services, creates barriers to innovation and leads to an unresponsive medi cal profession. The disciplinary {lowers granted to the licensing body also create a conllict of interest for die profession. An alternative approach to resolving this asymmetry would be dirough die use of agents (such as general practitioners or in surers) acting on behalf ol patients seeking a second opinion or specialist services (Epstein, 1996a) .
Failure of the Current Regime
The current arrangements for licensing medical practitioners are almost entirely aimed at ensuring the quality of those services dial are provided, often at the cost of reduced accessibility. The approach is to impose stringent criteria for entry to die profession and to strongly delineate die tasks carried out by allied professionals and by different specialists widiin die medical profession. Aldiough die Medical Coun cil exercises a disciplinary function, die reality in New Zealand is diat after meeting the entry criteria for specialist medical practice (which now includes family medicine or so-called general practice) through training and examination, doctors are essen tially licensed for their working lives. These entry requirements do generally ensure die ability and expertise of doctors, but diey reduce dieir number and hence access to medical services, and may fail to ensure that competence is maintained during a working life diat often stretches beyond 40 years. Further, die high barriers between disciplines reduce innovative practices to meet specific needs: lor example, die pre scription of certain classes of drugs by nurses, die multiskilling of surgeons for rural practice, or the recruitment of multiskilled and culturally appropriate health work ers to meet basic health care needs of Maori and Pacific Islanders.
In New Zealand, die adverse impact of diese barriers is currendy most apparent in die shortage of medical specialists in some disciplines, particularly psychiatry and ordiopaedic surgery. The shortage of psychiatrists and odier mental liealdi workers is a major public issue at a lime when die workforce need for trained mental healdi workers is increasing as a result of de-institutionalisation of psychiatric care and in creasing substance abuse, especially among die young and die mentally ill. The government is committed to expanding publicly financed mental healdi services, but has been unable to do so, at least in part because of difficulties in recruiting psychia trists. It is now more dian 20 years since die need to increase die number of psy chiatrists was recognised by targeted government funding of posts lor psychiatry trainees, but a persistendy high failure rate in die examination which represents die single route of qualificadon recognised by die Medical Councils in bodi Australia and New Zealand has perpetuated a shortage of psychiatrists in bodi countries.
The shortage of ordiopaedic surgeons and some odier surgical specialists is manifest dirough delays of between six and twelve weeks in obtaining an appoint ment to see a specialist in private praedee, even for a padent who is considered to have an urgent problem. Emergencies (trauma, cancer) are effecdvely treated in die public hospitals, but there are long queues for all odier condidons. It has also been suggested dial incomes for some specialists may include a significant rent compo nent resulting from a restriction in supply, a matter which has attracted die attention of die Commerce Commission. This shortage of surgical specialists is die direct consequence of restrictions on entry to die only recognised training program for surgeons in New Zealand, through limits imposed upon die accreditation of training posts by die College of Surgeons and its advisory bodies.
A furdier cause of public concern is die difficulty in recruiting and retaining general practitioners in rural areas, particularly in more remote Soudi Island dis tricts and in some smaller provincial towns. This situation persists despite concerns voiced by die Regional Healdi Audiorities of over-supply of general practitioners in some metropolitan areas, notably some suburbs in Auckland and in Dunedin, and large numbers of foreign medical graduates seeking admission to the medical regis ter in New Zealand. Clearly, die present licensing regime cannot be held fully re sponsible for diis maldistribution, which has more to do with the fee-for-service ap proach to primary care subsidies and the ability of general practitioners to earn ade quate incomes in city practice under present conditions; but it docs prevent innova tive solutions which might odierwise be found.
The historic approach to any dissatisfaction widi diese traditional arrangements has been to review die legislation and propose changes to die membership of die registration board established by dial legislation. Experience in New Zealand sug gests that such reviews may increase barriers to entry to die profession in question, preserve barriers to innovation and conflicts of interest, and provide only marginal benefits in die areas of information and indemnity (die Medical Practitioners Act 1995 is one such example). These reviews have not considered more radical re-form because of a presumption of the requirement lor a statutory approach to oc cupational certification.
Alternative Proposals
Dissatisfaction with the present regime of occupational regulation in the health sec tor in New Zealand has led to a number of reviews of regulation of specified profes sional groups, usually in the context of a review of the pertinent legislation, from which a number of suggestions for change have emerged. These suggestions have generally been informed by models for odier professional groups or by interna tional practice (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1998; Stewart, 1998) .
Ontario and die Netherlands have recently brought all regulated health profes sions under the umbrella of a single act, with die possibility also of amalgamating die corresponding registration boards. The objectives are to break down barriers between professional groups and possibly to reduce conflicts of interest and barriers to entry, diereby allowing greater consumer choice of healdi care provider, more llexible use of healdi professionals and evolution of die professions in line widi changing patterns of healdi care (Pew Healdi Professions Commission, 1995) . It will take time to ascertain whedier diese objectives can be achieved in diis way, but diere must be some uncertainty as die approach does not address die fundamental issue, that of monopoly rights in die provision of certification information for the individual occupational groups covered.
An alternative approach recendy taken up in bodi New Zealand and Australia is die explicit application of die provisions of competition legislation to professional practice. In New Zealand, die Commerce Act 1986 was amended in 1993 to apply to all providers of healdi or disability services, whedier public or private, in die same way as it applies to odier businesses. Similarly, in Australia die Competition Policy Reform Act 1995 amended die Trade Practices Act so as to extend its coverage to die professions. The objective of diese measures was to limit die ability of individ ual professional groups to continue practices which substantially lessen competition in die market. However, in regard to medical practitioners diis objective is frus trated in New Zealand as a result of die statutory powers granted to die Medical Council by die Medical Practitioners Act 1995. While diese powers are retained by a monopoly body substantially under die control of die profession itself, progress to increase competition and reduce die prices of services by opening up entry to bodi general and specialist practice is likely to be limited, despite die best efforts of die Commerce Commission.
Anodier approach would be to permit die franchise of alternative registration boards widi statutory {lowers, dius allowing contestability of certification widi die existing regulatory agencies. This would clearly eliminate die present monopoly position of diese agencies, dius reducing die ability of die professional groups to establish entry criteria at an inelficiendy high level. But die regime required to regulate die franchising arrangements would in itself create costs and erect barriers, W c are indebted to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. i thereby limiting the benefits.
All of the foregoing suggestions assume a continuation of statutory registration boards in some form or other.-A more radical reform would involve the replace ment of statutory provisions by voluntary arrangements for die certification of medical practitioners, as earlier suggested by Friedman (1962) . There arc a number of realistic approaches to such voluntary certification, ranging from certification by Üiird party payers, employers of healdi professionals, credentialling institutions (generally hospitals or clinics) or indemnity insurers, to certification by independent rating agencies. There would be a great deal in common between all diese ap proaches, because of die substandal degree of dcrcguladon involved, and die possi ble absence of any statutory prescripdon about how ccrdficadon should be achieved.
The remainder of diis article is devoted to elaborating diis model.
A System of Deregulated Certification: Key Elements
Establishing any truly deregulated system for die certification of healdi profession als, including medical practitioners, involves four key elements. These are:
• disclosure of specified information by any professional seeking to provide healdi care services. The information to be in die public domain would include name, qualifications widi dates, business address, scope of practice, and current stand ing widi bodi an independent certification audiority and an indemnity insurer;
• contestability in certifying die information required by disclosure;
• minimal statutory compliances for healdi professionals covering only disclosure and die statutory compliances generally required of die business and private community; and
• liability for die consequences of failure to meet an acceptable standard of care (medical malpractice) to lie widi die healdi care provider.
Each of diese elements is discussed in detail below.
Disclosure
A requirement to disclose specified information is a minimal and low-cost provision for the protection of die public, and would provide equivalent information to diat given by simple registration. The value of such information, however, would be gready enhanced by its independent certification and, providing diis certification were voluntary and contestable, it is likely diat die additional cost would be accept able. Independent certification by a reputable body would provide assurance to patients about die quality and standing of a practitioner's qualifications and exper-lise, and also about continuing competence were current standing with an indemnity insurer also fully disclosed and certified. Consideration would need to be given to whether there should also be public disclosure of all malpractice claims and disci plinary proceedings involving medical practitioners, as recently introduced for doc tors in die United States (Mullan etal., 1992; Epstein, 1997) .
There is a view that disclosure of information should be voluntary rather than compulsory. This approach would be consistent widi the basic principle diat volun tary arrangements should normally be preferred to compulsory ones on both moral and economic grounds, and be supported by the view that the consumer would be protected by his or her right to refuse to deal with any practitioner who failed to disclose essential information sought by a potential patient. It is also based upon an enlightened view of human nature and human abilities, which would have the con sumer accept die responsibility of attending to his or her own best interests, and would acknowledge die capacity of die majority of die populadon, direedy or dirough an agent of dieir own choosing, to do so at least as effectively as would a government agency (Epstein, 1996a) .
However, in respect of liealdi care serv ices, die public in New Zealand has be come accustomed to patcrnalisdc arrangements (Green, 1996) , and it is widely be lieved that to move direedy to a completely voluntary system in such circumstances could expose too many padents to an unacceptable risk (Evans, 1984) . This argu ment may be more justified in respect of health care services dian of odier services because of die intermittent and unpredictable incidence of serious illness or injury, die dependent state of a padent at the dine of such illness or injury, and die risk of serious and poLcndally irremediable harm in the case of incompetent care.
W hedier these fears are well-founded cannot be known, but, were change to be proposed, die strengdi of feeling on diis matter among the public would be fuelled by professionals widi a special interest in the status quo. Some compromise widi truly liberal arrangements regarding disclosure of information may be a necessary minimum concession to gain the public and polidcal support required to achieve dereguladon of die kind being suggested here. There would be an expectation that as die public became aware of the benefits of dereguladon and more confident in dieir ability to take a greater level of personal responsibility in the evaluation of their own liealdi care, die need to retain compulsion in this matter could be reviewed.
Contestability of Certification
Any substantial deregulation of medical practice in New Zealand would necessarily involve the repeal of die Medical Practitioners Act 1995 and die abolition of die Medical Council of New Zealand as a statutory audiority. The Medical Council presendy holds a monopoly of certification of information concerning qualif ications and of granting a licence to practise. As a minimum, deregulation would require diese roles to be contestable.
There is no reason why die certification of information concerning the qualifi cations, expertise and continuing competence of medical practitioners should not be a contestable service. There certainly would be a strong market for information of this kind were the Medical Council of New Zealand to cease to exist. At least four options to meet diis market come dircedy to mind. The first option would be for employers and credentialling bodies to take on die responsibility in-house. The second option would be for diird-party payers to do diis. However, in New Zealand such bodies are unlikely to achieve effective economics of scale in diis aedvity, and are more likely to purchase die information from odicr providers. The third opdon would be for indemnity insurers to undertake this task, and in die absence of any alternadve reliable sources of certification they would surely do so. But die most likely arrangement would be die establishment of one or more independent radng agencies to provide diese services.
Such agencies would be very like medical councils, but widiout a monopoly or any statutory protecdon, and widiout any role in discipline. They would gadier and evaluate information concerning qualificadons, experdse and performance from praeddoners, insdtudons, and insurers, and use diis informadon to provide risk management advice, possibly in die form of a risk radng, to employers, credendalling bodies, diird party payers, indemnity insurers and die public. Such risk rat ing would quickly gain acceptance for use by these various pardes; and contestability would control costs and ensure an acceptable degree of reliability.
Contestable certification could give rise to concern about die probity of some independent certification agents. There could be a risk diat agents may be willing to compromise certification standards on behalf of a client and thereby compromise die safety of diat client's patients. Such a risk might be credible in die case of an agent widiout an established reputation, but would be hardly conceivable in respect of a nationally or internationally established agency widi a reputation to preserve. Employers, third party payers and indemnity insurers would insist upon certification by reputable agents who could be held to account in the event of misadventure.
Minimal Statutory Compliances
Deregulation of healdi professional practice is unlikely to result in increased access and reduced costs if substantial statutory compliances remain in place in addition to diose generally required of businesses and the community. There is increasing concern in New Zealand already about die impacts of statutory compliances and dicir effect on economic performance. An escalation of substitute regulations for consumer protection in the wake of medical deregulation would largely negate die benefits of diis reform. This could be avoided only if die new arrangements for disclosure and certification of information and liability for medical malpractice pro vided appropriate safeguards lor die public.
Liability for Medical Malpractice
Medical malpractice, sometimes called medical error, is defined as failure by a regis tered healdi professional to meet an acceptable standard of care. Medical malprac tice does not necessarily result in an adverse outcome for die patient, and only a proportion of adverse outcomes are die result of medical malpractice. In consid-ering liability, it is essential to distinguish between adverse outcomes which occur despite entirely appropriate care, and those associated with malpractice.
Regarding die former, it is important to recognise that all medical treatment carries some risk, and adverse outcomes may result despite exemplary care. In diese circumstances die risk appropriately lies widi die padent as a trade-off against die expectadon of benefit from die treatment, and die padent should accordingly accept liability. Because die risk of considerable loss and high costs is small but significant, it is properly covered by first-party indemnity insurance (Epstein, 1996b) . However, second-party insurance cover by die healdi-carc provider could be administratively more convenient, widi die insurance premium set against die fees received for die services provided, "file direct or indirect acceptance of diis risk by die padent is a necessary feature of ediical medical practice.
However, when an adverse outcome results from medical malpractice, liability should clearly rest widi die practitioner and/or provider who have failed to meet an acceptable standard of care. Normally all liealdi care practitioners and institutional providers carry indemnity insurance cover to meet any claim resulting from alleged malpractice. This raises the question whedier full insurance cover in die absence of a medical disciplinary regime may result in less risk-averse behaviour by medical practitioners, which might not be in die interests of dieir patients or dieir insurers. For patients, die concerns of die practitioner or provider for dieir reputation, as well as die generally high standards of ediical practice in New Zealand in the context of small communities, high literacy and considerable media interest in the quality of health care delivery, would oiler some protection. Neverdieless, deregulation would inevitably place greater responsibility upon patients in their selection of pro viders ol healdi care. As far as insurers are concerned, die well-established mediods of reducing moral hazard, including liability covered by the insured to a threshold amount (excess or front-end deductible) and premiums based on claims history, are likely to be effective. The cost of this insurance, and consequendy fees to patients, could rise following deregulation, but this would depend more upon the details of the indemnity regime for personal injury resulting from medical malpractice apply ing in die relevant jurisdiction (see below) and changes in the incidence of such in jury, radier than upon deregulation as such.
In New Zealand, die indemnity arrangements for diese adverse outcomes are complicated by the provisions for personal injury under the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. This legislation provides indemnity against die costs of lurdier treatment and rehabilitation, and specified compensation for permanent handicap and loss of income resulting from medical misadventure. For the purposes of diis legislation, medical misadventure includes bodi medical error (medical malpractice) and medical mishap, which is defined as an adverse conse quence of healdi professional treatment properly given when bodi die likelihood of diis adverse consequence is rare (defined as less dian 1 per cent) and die adverse consequence is severe.
fhc Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act prohibits a per son from taking legal proceedings to recover damages in respect of personal injury covered by die Act. This provision, in clTect, replaces tort law by contract arrange ments lor resolving indemnity claims in respect of personal injury (sec Epstein, 1996b) , including that resulting from medical misadventure. It also limits financial liability for medical misadventure in New Zealand, and is a major factor in con straining medical indemnity insurance costs in this country. While Üiere is a gen eral consensus dial die overall benefits of diis provision outweigh die costs, it pro tects incompetent healdi professionals from die financial consequences of dieir shortcomings and reduces die risk to dieir insurers. This effect seriously diminishes one major disincentive to incompetent practice, namely, die financial risk from liti gation. If diis risk were high, die premium lor indemnity insurance would be corre spondingly high, and in die extreme case insurance could be unobtainable. The present licensing regime protects indemnity insurers, including die Accident Reha bilitation and Compensation Insurance Corporation (ACC) in New Zealand, by excluding obviously incompetent practitioners. Abolition of licensing accordingly could have a major impact on indemnity, and no alternative regime would be sus tainable if diis issue were not effectively addressed prior to implementation.
There arc a number of possible approaches to diis problem. The simplest measure widiin the current legislation would be a more explicit experience rating lor the ACC premiums of healdi professionals who contribute to die Medical Misad venture Account. In die first instance diis could be indexed to an independent rat ing by a recognised rating agency, with a default premium for any practitioner un able to provide an acceptable rating. This measure, in any case, would be an essen tial preliminary if die Medical Misadventure Account were to be opened to private insurers or even self-insurance, as is occurring widi the Employers' Account.
Probably a more effective measure would be to amend the present ACC legisla tion to permit die ACC or alternative insurer to recover all their indemnity costs from die liable practitioner in cases of medical error (medical malpractice). This would clearly transfer the liability for medical malpractice to die practitioner and that practitioner's indemnity insurer, while retaining die generally beneficial contrac tual approach of the ACC legislation to personal injury liability.
A third approach would be to exclude medical error altogether from coverage by ACC legislation. In effect diis would allow medical malpractice to be covered through indemnity insurance contracts held by the individual practitioner and by institutional health care providers, with common law tort remedies as the default provision.
O f diese dircc approaches, a combination of the first and die second is likely to be favoured as providing an explicit and economical padi lor any person seeking a remedy diat would meet die condition of requiring indemnity cosLs to rest widi the liable practitioner. However, lor diis approach to be fully effective in assigning li ability, it would be a precondition diat indemnity insurance for medical malpractice be lully contestable (Epstein, 1996b) , through opening die ACC Medical Misadven ture Account to private insurers or to self-insurance. This contestability of insur ance would provide die necessary incentives for insurers to recover dieir costs in any cases involving medical error. The diird approach, removal of coverage for personal injury resulting from medical error from the ACC legislation, could in crease die occurrence of unrewarding litigation, create incentives to hide medical malpractice, and result in escalating costs arising from tort actions.
If medical and other health professional practice were deregulated, section 5 of die Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 defining medi cal misadventure, would require review. This secdon, for die purposes of die Act, restricts die definition of bodi medical error and medical mishap, and diereby medical misadventure, to events associated widi treatment by a registered liealdi professional. A review of diese definitions would be necessary to ensure diat ap propriate coverage under die Act would continue alter deregulation. It is likely diat insurers, whedier ACC or private, would continue to require some form of reputa ble certification in order to protect dieir interests.
Public Requirements: Would These Proposals Meet Them?
W e believe dial die arrangements described in diis article would adequately meet die needs of die public for information and assign liability f or medical malpractice. In addition, diey would offer the benefits generally associated widi deregulation of any commercial activities through increased availability, improved quality and re duced costs. Specifically, abolishing the requirement for a licence to practise and allowing certification to become contestable could:
• provide opportunities for entry to practise to diose currendy excluded;
• permit multiskilling of die present healdi professional workforce, including an assumption by other practitioners of roles and tasks traditionally reserved to a specified occupational group; and
• enhance opportunities for health professionals with qualifications gained outside New Zealand and Australia to practise in these countries.
All diese features would be in accordance widi die overall direction of recent gov ernment policy in New: Zealand, and widi die desire of die public generally to have increased access to healdi care services. The valid concern lor the maintenance of quality and for safety considerations could be met by:
• a voluntary certification regime togedier widi an acceptance by die patient of responsibility to ensure dial any practitioner consulted were properly qualified;
• ensuring diat liability for malpractice is properly borne by the practitioner, not by die state; and
• a likely conservative response of diird-party funders and indemnity insurers to new entry of practitioners seeking to provide services.
In addition, the incentives in the system described could ensure tlie continuing competence and maintenance of standards by all doctors Üiroughout Üieir working lives, at least to die degree achieved under die present statutory reguladons.
Relevance for Other Occupational Groups
The model elaborated here has been specifically developed in the context ol die requirements lor medical praedee, for which protection of padents from personal injury or even deadi as a result of malpractice is die principal justification lor statu tory reguladon. This same jusdficadon also applies in die praedee ol odier liealdi professionals, such as nurses, dendsts, physiodierapists, pharmacists and optome trists, and diis model equally could be adopted for diose groups. Whedier it ap propriately could be extended to die reguladon of odier occupadons, such as elec tricians or plumbers, about whom die safety of the public also is a primary concern, is less clear to us because of die requirements of die building and odier statutory codes affeedng diese occupadons, which lie outside our personal experience. Nev ertheless, we believe diat die general principles underlying die model could be ap plied to occupadonal reguladon in general, including die reguladon of occupadons in law, insurance, banking and securities, to name only a few, for which the concern is the probity and accountability of die provider of services radier than the personal safety of die consumer. Indeed, diese principles already generally apply in diose occupations which arc substantially deregulated, such as accountancy in New Zea land, in respect of which die public interest is protected by voluntary arrangements, together widi the general requirements of legislation such as die Fair Trading Act 1986 and die obligations o f 'caveat emptor'.
